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Abstract 
 
In this paper we consider the connection between crime and the labour market in a 
different way to existing work. We focus on a situation where the introduction of a 
minimum wage floor to a labour market previously unregulated by minimum wage 
legislation provided substantial pay increases for low paid workers. From a theoretical 
perspective we argue that this wage boost has the potential to alter peoples’ incentives to 
participate in crime. We formulate empirical tests, based upon area-level data in England 
and Wales, which look at what happened to crime rates before and after the introduction 
of the national minimum wage to the UK labour market in April 1999. Comparing police 
force area-level crime rates before and after the minimum wage introduction produces 
evidence in line with the notion that changing economic incentives for low wage workers 
can influence crime. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Crime remains an issue high on the public policy agenda. Expenditure on crime related 
issues is now the fourth highest government expenditure after health, education and 
defence. Placed in this context it is probably not surprising that, over the years, a large 
amount of research, in various social science disciplines, has attempted to explain crime 
patterns. An important strand of this research concerns possible links between crime and 
the labour market. The vast majority of existing work in this area focuses on crime and 
unemployment, but a lack of consensual evidence has rendered the relationship to be 
fragile at best (see Box, 1987; Chiricos, 1987; Freeman, 1999). More recently empirical 
work has instead focused on connections between crime and the low wage labour market 
(Gould et al, 2002; Machin and Meghir, 1999; May, 2001) and this work has been more 
successful at establishing significant correlations.1 When coupled with the observation 
that many crimes seem to be committed by people in work (Fagan and Freeman, 1999; 
Grogger, 1998) this seems to demonstrate the existence of a connection between crime 
and the low wage labour market. 
At the same time some research in economics has emphasised that comparisons of 
outcomes before and after minimum wage changes, if properly formulated, can provide a 
useful way of measuring the impact of changes in the low wage labour market.  There is 
by now a sizable literature on the employment effects of minimum wages that takes this 
precise approach (Brown, 1999, gives an up to date review of the literature). Other work 
(DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux, 1996; Dickens, Machin and Manning, 1999; Lee, 2001; 
Dickens and Manning, 2001) has linked changes in wage inequality to minimum wages, 
                                                 
1  There is also a related body of work that looks at links between crime and measures of labour market 
inequality (a recent UK example being Witt, Clarke and Fielding, 1999). 
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arguing that at least part of the recent changes in wage structure can be attributed to shifts 
in minimum wages.2
 In this paper we draw on the approaches used in the minimum wage literature to 
try and measure the impact of changes in the low wage labour market on crime. This 
offers a rather different way of looking at crime and the labour market than in earlier 
work. For reasons we argue throughout the paper, we also think this a better methodology 
to adopt as it uses minimum wage changes in a quasi-experimental setting where low 
wage workers are given a wage boost by the policy introduction. If it is these workers 
who are likely to be on the margins of crime then the wage boost offers a potential route 
for them to desist from partaking in criminal activities.  
There are good theoretical reasons for believing that this is a sensible research 
strategy. Basic economic models of criminal behaviour (Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1973, 
1996) emphasise that decisions by individuals who are on the margins of crime are likely 
to be shaped by changes in the perceived wage returns to legal and illegal activities. If the 
minimum wage introduction yields a big enough wage boost to such individuals then it is 
possible that they may alter their behaviour by cutting back on crime. This is what we 
explore in this paper by estimating empirical models that relate changes in crime to the 
incidence of low pay across the police force areas of England and Wales. 
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the 
introduction of the minimum wage to the UK labour market, along with its relation to 
area wage structures and area crime. Section 3 details the data used in our empirical 
work, then discusses some descriptive statistics and initial findings. Section 4 then 
                                                 
2 DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) and Lee (2001) provide evidence that the failure to uprate the US 
federal minimum wage through the 1980s and its subsequent increases at the start of the 1990s and in the 
mid 1990s had a noticeable impact on the wage distribution. Dickens, Machin and Manning (1999) show 
that the old industry based system of minimum wages that used to operate in Britain until abolition in 1993 
(the Wages Councils) compressed the wage distributions of the sectors they covered.  
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discusses econometric estimates of area crime models. Finally, section 5 offers some 
concluding remarks. 
 
2. The Introduction of the UK National Minimum Wage 
The UK National Minimum Wage 
In April 1999 the UK government introduced a national minimum wage into a labour 
market that was not previously regulated by minimum wage legislation. It was set at 
£3.60 for people aged 22 and higher, and at £3.00 for those aged 18 to 21. This was the 
first time there had been a systematic wage floor in the UK at the national level. The old 
system that had operated up to its abolition in 1993 - the Wages Councils – only 
regulated the wages of workers in certain (usually low wage) industries.  
Metcalf’s (1999) ex-ante analysis of the introduction of the minimum wage 
predicted that the minimum wage would increase the wages of around 9 percent of the 
workforce. Amongst these beneficiaries he estimated the average wage increase to be of 
the order of 30 percent (Metcalf, 1999, Table 5, page F59). This is clearly a sizable wage 
gain. That a large number of workers (though probably not as high as Metcalf’s 9 
percent) benefited is borne out by the ex-post study of Labour Force Survey data before 
and after minimum wage introduction by Dickens and Manning (2001). Their study 
shows a significant impact of the minimum wage on the wage distribution, with around 6 
to 7 percent of workers getting wage gains. Interestingly, whilst they show sizable gains 
at lower percentiles of the distribution, they also report very little evidence of spillover 
effects up the wage distribution. 
The Impact on Area Wage Structures 
It is likely that the introduction of the minimum wage will have a differential 
effect across areas depending on the initial proportion of low paid people in each area. In 
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areas with a higher proportion of people paid beneath the minimum the year before its 
introduction there should be a bigger effect on the area wage structure, as wage levels 
should rise by more than in areas where a smaller proportion of workers are paid beneath 
the minimum wage. This variation provides us with a quasi-experimental structure with 
which to analyse the effect of the minimum wage on criminal outcomes. This structure is 
obviously rather similar to some of the more recent economic studies of the impact of US 
minimum wages on employment: for example, Card’s (1992) study where identification 
of the impact of the early 1990s US minimum wage increases arises from regional 
variations induced by differences in the proportion of low wage workers across different 
US states. 
Differential Changes in Area Wage Structures and Crime 
If one can establish that the impact of the minimum wage was different across 
different areas then this provides a means to test simple economic models of crime that 
assert economic incentives matter for crime. The usual formulation of these models is 
such that individuals weigh up the expected benefits and costs from crime, taking into 
account a probability of being apprehended and punished if caught, and that monetary 
returns (from legal labour market factors and from illegal criminal activities) can affect 
their cost-benefit calculation (see Becker, 1968, or Ehrlich, 1973, for the classic 
expositions). From an empirical perspective the model easily translates into a criminal 
participation equation that relates crime to labour market wages, the wage returns from 
crime and measures of deterrence and punishment if caught (see Freeman, 1999).  
In this paper we view the minimum wage as providing a boost to labour market 
wages that may shift individuals on the margins of crime away from crime. As long as 
the other key factors determining crime do not shift at the same time then we will be able 
to identify a link between crime and the labour market by looking at what happens to 
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crime in areas that are differentially affected by the minimum wage introduction. The 
prediction that follows from the basic economic model of crime is that, to the extent that 
the minimum wage impact on wages does differ by area, crime should be moderated in 
areas where there is a higher initial level of low wage workers. Of course, we also need to 
control for possible shifts in the other determinants of crime and we are careful to do this 
in our empirical models (this is discussed below). Furthermore, one needs to ensure that 
any link we may pick up around the period of minimum wage introduction is not a 
relationship that exists anyway. Our empirical work therefore also benchmarks our basic 
findings against the relationship between crime and low wages in earlier time periods 
where no minimum wage legislation was in place. 
 
3. Data on Crime and the Labour Market and Descriptive Analysis 
Crime Data 
For our basic analysis of the relationship between crime and the low wage labour market 
before and after minimum wage introduction we use data on offences reported to and 
recorded by the police at police force area level in England and Wales over a two year 
period. The first period is the financial year prior to the introduction of the national 
minimum wage (April 1998 to March 1999) and the second is the year following its 
introduction (April 1999 to March 2000).3  
There are 43 police force areas in England and Wales. However, for the purposes 
of our research we aggregate these to form 41 areas. This is for two separate reasons. 
First of all we aggregate the City of London and Metropolitan police force areas to a 
                                                 
3 By using the official statistics it may be the case that we are overlooking the crimes that are either not 
reported to, or recorded by the police. However, because of increased public awareness and legal 
requirements to report crimes, coupled with more precise recording practices by the police, most crimes 
that do not appear in the official statistics are the more trivial offences. For a recent discussion and more 
details on possible under-reporting problems, described as the ‘dark figure’ of crime, see McDonald (2001). 
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single London aggregate because the crime rate is artificially high in the City of London 
(due to its low population).4 Secondly because of a boundary change that occurred in 
Gwent and South Wales in the mid-1990s (and because some of our models use data 
from earlier periods) we aggregate these two Welsh police forces together as well. 
We look at four different crimes: the total number of notified offences; the 
number of property crimes (defined as burglary plus theft and handling); vehicle crimes 
(theft of a vehicle, theft from a vehicle, aggravated vehicle taking, vehicle interference 
and criminal damage to a vehicle); and violent crimes (violence against the person).   
One might very plausibly ask if our interest is in the possible links between crime 
and monetary measures then why do we choose to look violent crimes as well as non-
violent crimes? The justification to look at non-violent crimes is very clear from the 
economic model but many commentators would argue that violent crimes are much less 
likely (if at all) to be shaped by monetary factors. Our view is that this is essentially an 
unresolved issue and one can put forward arguments both ways.5 As such we choose to 
present empirical models of violent crime as well. 
Labour Market Data 
We obtained our labour market variables by aggregating individual-level data to 
police force area. This was done using data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS), 
matched using a county level identifier to the police force areas. Our principal measure 
looking at whether the minimum wage introduction had a differential effect by police 
force area is a variable which measures the proportion of workers paid beneath the hourly 
minimum in the year before its introduction (£3.60 for people aged 22+, £3.00 for 18-21 
year olds).  We mainly use this variable to gauge the extent to which there is a differential 
                                                 
4 This actually makes no difference in practice as our descriptive statistics and regression results are 
population weighted. But it seems neater and more natural to aggregate the two London areas together. 
5 For example, Grogger (2000) presents a model of violent crime where economic incentives matter. 
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impact of the minimum wage across police force areas. Towards the end of the paper we 
also consider other variables measuring the nature of the low wage labour market as 
robustness checks of our main findings. 
Our empirical models also control for a number of other factors which theory and 
past empirical work inform us could be influencing the relationship between crime and 
the introduction of the minimum wage. These include changes in the demographic 
structure of areas or in the likelihood of detection that could be occurring during the time 
period we are examining. The demographic variables we consider come from the LFS 
and are area measures of average age, the population shares of women, of young (<25) 
men, of those with no educational qualifications and the share of public sector jobs in 
total employment. To look at changes in detection rates that may coincide with our time 
periods of study we look at the clear up rate, namely the proportion of crimes that were 
solved by the police in each area. 
One other variable of particular interest that we derive from the LFS is the area 
unemployment rate. We are interested in possible connections between changes in crime 
and changes in the unemployment rate for at least two reasons. First a lot of the existing 
crime research has focused on the link between crime and unemployment. Secondly, 
there has been a great deal of discussion as to whether the minimum wage would actually 
increase unemployment by pricing workers out of jobs. As noted in the introduction there 
is only very weak and fragile evidence on the first question but the nature of our data 
means we can take another look at it here. On the second point, and more importantly, to 
date there is little evidence that the introduction of the UK minimum wage seemed 
detrimental to jobs (Stewart, 2001) except in some sectors that are very vulnerable to the 
minimum due to having large numbers of low wage workers (like the care homes sector 
studied in Machin, Manning and Rahman, 2001). However, it is important here to allow 
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for a possible unemployment effect of minimum wages that may arise due to the 
differential impact of the minimum on wages across areas and we do so in our empirical 
work. 
Descriptive Analysis 
Table 1 begins our empirical analysis by showing the relationship between area 
wage structures and the pre-minimum wage introduction extent of low pay. This is done 
by dividing areas into groups on the basis of the proportion of people paid beneath the 
national minimum wage in the year prior to its introduction. The police force areas of 
England and Wales were divided up into four areas described as ‘most low pay’ (where 
over 11.7 percent of workers were paid beneath the minimum in the initial period), 
‘second most low pay’ (between 10.2 and 11.7 percent beneath the minimum), ‘second 
least low pay’ (between 7.5 and 10.2 percent) and ‘least low pay’ (less than 7.5 percent 
below the minimum). The Table shows the hourly wage at different percentile points of 
the wage distribution for each of these areas and then changes over time for each area, 
together with gaps in the change between the ‘most low pay’ and ‘least low pay’ areas. 
These latter changes (given in bold) can be thought of as ‘difference-in-difference’ 
estimates of the impact of the minimum wage on different points of the wage distribution. 
The upper panel of the Table focuses on the 10th percentile of the hourly wage 
distribution, then the lower panels consider the 25th, 50th and 90th percentiles. The upper 
panel of the Table shows there to have been quite sizable wage increases at the 10th 
percentile in the period surrounding minimum wage introduction. Furthermore, the scale 
of these increases was different across areas, with the ‘most low pay’ area 10th percentile 
increasing by 35 pence per hour and the ‘least low pay’ area also increasing significantly, 
but only by 18 pence per hour. The difference-in-difference of 17 pence per hour (which 
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is statistically significant) shows a stronger beneficial impact of the minimum wage on 
the 10th percentile to have occurred in low wage areas. 
But, like other research in this area (notably Dickens and Manning, 2001) the 
minimum wage does not seem to impact higher up the distribution. There are no 
differences across areas at the 25th percentile where the changes in hourly wages are very 
similar across areas (the difference-in-difference now being only 1 pence, and completely 
insignificant). The same is true at the median. At the top of the distribution the opposite 
occurs and the 90th percentile grows by more in the ‘least low pay’ areas, though this will 
be for reasons unconnected to the minimum wage introduction. Nevertheless there is an 
important impact on wage structures that differs across areas at the lower end of the 
distribution. 
In Table 2 we look at changes in crime rates (defined as crimes per 1000 
population) across the same group of four areas as in Table 1. Looking at the difference-
in-difference estimates given in bold a very clear pattern emerges. For all four crimes 
there seems to be a reduction of crime in the ‘most low pay’ areas as compared to the 
‘least low pay areas’. For example, the year-on-year change in the total crime rate was 
around 11.6 crimes lower per 1000 people (comparable numbers for property, vehicle and 
violent crimes being 6.3, 3.2 and 1.6 respectively). Furthermore, for the non-violent 
crimes this gap seems to be driven by crime falling in the areas with more low paid 
workers and rising in the areas with few low paid workers. For violent crimes the crime 
rate appears to increase across all areas, but by less where there are more low wage 
workers. 
 Thus, the descriptive statistics seem to indicate that the introduction of the 
minimum wage operated as we would expect, increasing wages at the bottom end of the 
wage distribution thereby reducing wage inequality more in areas with a higher 
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proportion of workers paid beneath the minimum level before introduction. Further to 
this, crime seems to have been moderated (in relative terms) in those areas more affected 
by the introduction of the minimum wage (i.e. those with a higher proportion of workers 
paid beneath the minimum level before April 1999). 
 This pattern is confirmed in Figure 1 which plots the change in the crime rates 
against the initial proportion low paid over the period prior to and post the minimum 
wage introduction separately for total, property, vehicle and violent crime. The graphs 
show, for all crime types, that crime went up by less in the areas with more low paid 
workers in the period before the minimum wage was introduced. All the regression lines 
fitted through the data points show there to be a negative relationship between changes in 
crime and the initial low pay proportion. The next section puts these findings to a more 
rigorous test by subjecting the data to a range of econometric tests. 
 
4. Econometric Estimates 
Basic Regression Results 
Table 3 shows the results of regressions of changes in crime on the proportion of 
workers paid less than the minimum in the period before the minimum wage was 
introduced. Three sets of specifications are reported for each category of offence.  The 
first is a simple regression of the change in crime on the initial period proportion of 
workers paid beneath the minimum. This is simply the slope of the regression lines fitted 
through the data points given in Figure 1. The second sees how this is affected by adding 
in the demographic controls6 and the change in the crime clear up rate. The third then 
additionally adds in the change in the unemployment rate. 
                                                 
6 The estimated coefficients on these variables are not reported as our main concern is with the initial 
proportion low paid variable.  
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A comparison of column (1) and (2) shows the negative relationship between all 
four changes in crime measures and the initial low pay proportion is not wiped out by the 
inclusion of the extra variables. In all cases the estimated coefficient on the initial low 
pay proportion falls in (absolute terms) but it remains statistically significant. The 
coefficient on the change in the clear up rate is interesting, as it appears to suggest 
negative deterrence effects for non-violent crimes but displays no association with 
changes in violent crimes. Nonetheless, the column (2) findings reinforce the earlier 
descriptive analysis, showing relative falls in crime occurring in the lower wage areas 
that were more affected by the introduction of the minimum wage. 
The final column (3) specification adds in changes in the log(unemployment rate).  
Its inclusion has little effect on the coefficient on the initial low pay proportion, which 
remains negative and statistically significant for all four crimes (though it is very much 
on the margins of significance for violent crimes). In terms of the coefficient on the 
change in unemployment, for total, property and vehicle crime there is no statistically 
significant association between changes in crime and changes in unemployment. 
However, for changes in violent crime the coefficient on the change in the unemployment 
rate is estimated to be positive and significant. This is the only place we are able to detect 
an unemployment effect, supporting the discussion in Freeman (1999) that the 
relationship between crime and unemployment is a hard one to uncover. 
Benchmarking Against Earlier Time Periods 
The results so far point to relative crime reductions in areas where a greater 
proportion of workers were affected by the minimum wage introduction. This is 
suggestive of links between crime and the low wage labour market. But what if such a 
link existed in periods before minimum wage introduction? Our finding would turn out to 
be spurious if the same kind of link did exist. Indeed were it the case that crime rates also 
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fell in relative terms by a similar magnitude in low wage areas in time periods when the 
minimum wage was not present, then our results could not be attributed to the 
introduction of the minimum wage.  
To rule out this possibility and ensure we are actually identifying changes 
resulting from the introduction of the minimum wage we need to look at econometric 
models specified in the same way as those already considered for earlier time periods. 
Thus, Table 4 shows a set of results from regressions that benchmark the basic results 
against the relationship between changes in crime and the initial low paid proportion in 
earlier time periods. As these add a further differenced set of data, in the control periods 
where there was no minimum wage legislation in operation, one can think of these 
estimates as triple differenced, or difference-in-difference-in-difference estimates.7
Table 4 reports coefficients on the initial low pay proportion in the period 
surrounding minimum wage introduction from five specifications for each model of 
crime. Columns (1) to (3) are the same specifications as in Table 3, but benchmarked 
against earlier time periods. The change in the period surrounding minimum wage 
introduction (from financial year 1998/99 to financial year 1999/2000) is compared to 
changes in two earlier time periods (the change from financial year 1996/97 to 1997/98 
and the change from 1995/96 to 1996/97). The reason for these choice of benchmark 
periods is a change in the way that crime statistics were collected by police force areas 
that occurred in 1998 prevents us from being able to calculate the change from financial 
year 1997/98 to 1998/99.8 However, the Home Office has published scaling factors that 
                                                 
7 Or alternatively one can think of the estimates as difference-in-difference estimates of the change model 
(i.e. double-differenced in changes rather than triple-differenced in levels). As such they compare the 
relationship between changes in crime and the initial low pay proportion in the treatment period 
surrounding minimum wage introduction with the same relationship in the earlier (non-minimum wage) 
control periods. 
8 This is because April 1998 saw a change in the way crimes were counted and classified under Home 
Office rules. The changes, and their effects on crime by area and type of crime, are discussed in detail in 
Annex A of Home Office (1999). The principal motivation for the change was to try and get crime statistics 
 12
(for total crimes) can bridge this gap (as they collected crime numbers on the old and new 
reporting basis) and so we also include the scaled change for these financial years in the 
control group in column (4). Column (5) then implements a very stringent test, 
additionally including into the column (3) specification a full set of police force area 
trends. 
The coefficients reported in the first three columns of the Table make it clear that 
our earlier estimates are not picking up a relationship that existed in earlier time periods. 
For total, property and vehicle crimes the coefficient on the low pay proportion is seen to 
be significantly more negative in the period surrounding minimum wage introduction 
than in the comparison periods. The coefficient in the violent crime equation is also 
negative but the standard error is large, making the estimates very imprecise. 
As already noted, the first three columns of Table 4 exclude the period measuring 
changes across financial years 1997/1998 to 1998/99 (the change period directly 
preceding the period surrounding minimum wage introduction) due to the change in the 
way that crimes were counted that occurred from April 1998.9 However, as already 
noted, we do have a set of scaling factors reported by the Home Office (1999) that we can 
use to compute the change for this period in a manner consistent with the minimum wage 
introduction years to see whether this definitional change matters or not for our main 
findings. The results produced by incorporating the scaled data from this extra period are 
                                                                                                                                                 
to measure one crime per victim and to widen the definition of a notifiable offence (to include all indictable 
and triable-either-way offences plus some related summary offences). The Home Office reports that the 
definition change mostly affected violent crime, drug crime and fraud and criminal damage. Notice that we 
do not include the latter three crimes in our analysis but, for the crimes we analyse, the counting rule 
changes are more likely to affect the total and violent crime rates whilst being relatively unimportant for 
property and vehicle crimes. 
9  The reporting change means in practice that we are unable to compute crime numbers for the financial 
year 1997/98 on the same basis as the 1998/99 and 1999/2000 financial years. 
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given in column (4).10 They tend to confirm the earlier picture as the coefficients on the 
initial proportion low paid actually become slightly more negative (though reassuringly 
they remain insignificantly different from those in column (3)). 
The nature of the data, on the same areas followed through time, means that one 
can also adopt an even more stringent test by including area-specific trends in the 
estimating equation. The final column of the Table therefore additionally includes 41 area 
trend variables. The coefficients are reduced by this inclusion and, of course as one 
would expect, the standard errors rise, yet the results remain robust to this. 
Overall it seems that benchmarking against earlier time periods acts to reinforce 
the findings presented before. There appears to be a stronger negative relationship 
between crime and low pay in the period surrounding the minimum wage introduction. 
This is a robust finding for most crimes (i.e. except for the much noisier data on violent 
crimes) and is in line with the idea that the altering of economic incentives brought about 
by the introduction of the minimum wage may well have caused individuals on the 
margins of crime to desist. 
Further Considerations 
A final potentially relevant consideration is that, to date, we have used measures 
of the extent of low pay in the overall area labour market. Whilst we think our measures 
are a useful barometer of the state of the low wage labour market in these local areas, it is 
also the case that most people do not commit crimes and that those that do or those who 
are on the margins of criminal choice are disproportionately males, young and are likely 
to be in low skill jobs. 
                                                 
10 Notice that the scaling factors are for total crimes and we do not have them for the specific crimes we 
consider in the lower panels of the Table. We do apply the scaling factors to the other crimes but one 
should clearly focus more on the total crime equations in column (4) of the upper panel of the Table. 
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Therefore, we have estimated regression models (comparable to column (3) of 
Table 4) that refine the nature of the initial low pay variable. These are shown in Table 5. 
The Table reports estimated coefficients on three different measures of low pay in the 
period prior to minimum wage introduction. Column (1) reports the estimated coefficient 
from a model incorporating a measure of the proportion beneath the minimum for males 
employed in occupations where the mean wage is below the 25th percentile of the average 
male wage. We refer to this as the low skill males low pay measure. Column (2) uses the 
initial low pay proportion for males under the age of 25 only. Finally, column (3) returns 
to the full sample of people in a police force area but, rather than using the headcount 
measure considered so far, computes how far the wage bill would need to be raised to 
take all people initially beneath the minimum up to the minimum wage. This will give 
potentially different results to the headcount if the wage shortfall differs across areas. 
Because we are focusing on specific sub-groups then one should note that the 
magnitude of the estimated coefficients will differ from earlier results and indeed that is 
what happens in Table 5.11 But the general thrust of the earlier results is certainly borne 
out. There is seen to be a more pronounced negative relationship between changes in 
crime and the initial low pay proportion in the period surrounding minimum wage 
introduction in the police force areas of England and Wales. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Our main focus in this paper is on trying to empirically identify links between 
crime and the labor market. To do so we adopt a rather different approach to that taken in 
the existing literature. We look at what happened to crime before and after a large 
regulatory change was made in the UK, namely when the government introduced a 
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minimum wage floor to a labour market previously unregulated by minimum wage 
legislation. This minimum wage introduction benefited a sizable number of workers. We 
try and see whether the wage gains resulting from minimum wage introduction were able 
to alter incentives to participate in crime. This is what one would expect from simple 
economic models of crime that argue that shifting the relative monetary gains between 
legal and illegal activities can alter individual’s likelihood of doing crime.  
We test this prediction by noting that there were more beneficiaries from the 
minimum wage introduction in some police force areas of England and Wales than in 
others. We thus relate changes in crime rates across police force areas in the period 
before and after minimum wage introduction to the proportion of workers beneath the 
minimum wage before its introduction. We uncover a statistically significant negative 
relationship, showing relative crime reductions in areas that initially had more low wage 
workers. This finding remains robust to controlling for other relevant determinants of 
crime, to benchmarking against earlier time periods and to using initial period wage 
measures that look at the types of individuals one thinks are more likely to be on the 
margins of crime. Overall our results are in line with the notion that altering wage 
incentives can affect crime and therefore that there exists a link between crime and the 
low wage labour market. 
                                                                                                                                                 
11 In fact the means of the three variables in the pre-introduction year were: low skill males .08; young 
males .15; wage bill .01. Hence the differences in scale of the reported coefficients. 
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Figure 1: 
Changes in Crime Rates And The Initial Proportion Low Paid, 
Between April 1998–March 1999 And April 1999-March 2000 
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Notes: Population weighted regression line fit through data points 
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Table 1:  
The Introduction of the National Minimum Wage And  
Area Hourly Wage Structures 
 
 
 
 Year Before 
Introduction 
Year After 
Introduction 
Change  
(Standard Error) 
10th Percentile 
Most Low Pay 3.25 3.60 .35 (.03) 
2nd Most Low Pay 3.43 3.70 .26 (.03) 
2nd Least Low Pay 3.58 3.82 .24 (.06) 
Least Low Pay 3.96 4.13 .18 (.10) 
Most Low Pay – Least 
Low Pay 
-.71 (.06) -.54 (.08) .17 (.06) 
25th Percentile 
Most Low Pay 4.17 4.40 .23 (.06) 
2nd Most Low Pay 4.39 4.61 .22 (.07) 
2nd Least Low Pay 4.63 4.90 .27 (.12) 
Least Low Pay 5.22 5.45 .23 (.18) 
Most Low Pay – Least 
Low Pay 
-1.06 (.13) -1.05 (.15) .01 (.06) 
50th Percentile 
Most Low Pay 5.80 6.09 .30 (.11) 
2nd Most Low Pay 6.13 6.47 .34 (.12) 
2nd Least Low Pay 6.55 6.97 .42 (.25) 
Least Low Pay 7.51 7.81 .30 (.38) 
Most Low Pay – Least 
Low Pay 
-1.71 (.26) -1.72 (.29) -.01 (.10) 
90th Percentile 
Most Low Pay 12.19 12.59 .41 (.24) 
2nd Most Low Pay 12.63 12.97 .34 (.36) 
2nd Least Low Pay 14.07 14.67 .55 (.53) 
Least Low Pay 16.22 17.44 1.22 (.90) 
Most Low Pay – Least 
Low Pay 
-4.03 (.69) -4.84 (.63) -.81 (.35) 
 
Notes: 
Areas are split into four (almost) equal sized groups of police force areas (3 groups of 10 and one of 11 
areas). The groupings are based upon the proportion of workers paid less than the minimum wage in the 
year prior to its introduction. Areas in the Most Low Pay group have over 11.7 percent of workers beneath 
the minimum wage. Areas in the 2nd Most Low Pay group have between 10.2 and 11.7 percent of workers 
beneath the minimum. Areas in the 2nd Least Low Pay group have between 7.5 and 10.2 percent of workers 
beneath the minimum. Areas in the Least Low Pay group have less than 7.5 percent of workers beneath the 
minimum wage. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 2: 
The Introduction of the National Minimum Wage  
And Area Crime Rates (Per 1000 Population) 
 
 
 
 Year Before 
Introduction 
Year After 
Introduction 
Change  
(Standard Error) 
Total Crime Rate 
Most Low Pay 98.47 96.04 -2.43 (11.54) 
2nd Most Low Pay 100.11 101.94 1.83 (14.73) 
2nd Least Low Pay 102.52 105.52 3.00 (13.06) 
Least Low Pay 99.11 108.24 9.14 (22.03) 
Most Low Pay – Least 
Low Pay 
-.64 (16.22) -12.21 (18.80) -11.56 (3.54) 
Property Crime Rate 
Most Low Pay 63.50 60.24 -3.26 (8.99) 
2nd Most Low Pay 60.93 59.08 -1.86 (8.99) 
2nd Least Low Pay 66.26 65.21 -1.05 (8.04) 
Least Low Pay 57.73 60.75 3.03 (9.61) 
Most Low Pay – Least 
Low Pay 
5.77 (8.91) -.51 (9.69) -6.28 (1.95) 
Vehicle Crime Rate 
Most Low Pay 28.12 26.04 -2.08 (3.39) 
2nd Most Low Pay 30.28 30.25 -.03 (5.55) 
2nd Least Low Pay 31.02 30.70 -.32 (4.22) 
Least Low Pay 27.13 28.26 1.13 (3.55) 
Most Low Pay – Least 
Low Pay 
.99 (3.43) -2.22 (3.51) -3.21 (.80) 
Violent Crime Rate 
Most Low Pay 8.33 8.91 .58 (1.04) 
2nd Most Low Pay 10.03 11.60 1.58 (1.69) 
2nd Least Low Pay 8.51 9.87 1.36 (1.82) 
Least Low Pay 11.47 13.61 2.15 (4.86) 
Most Low Pay – Least 
Low Pay 
-3.14 (3.19) -4.70 (3.79) -1.56 (.65) 
 
Notes: 
As for Table 1. 
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Table 3: 
Regressions of Changes in Log(Crime Rates)  
on the Initial Low Pay Proportion Across Police Force Areas in the Years  
Before And After Minimum Wage Introduction 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Change in Log(Total Crime Rate) 
Proportion Paid Beneath Minimum Wage in Year 
Before Introduction 
-1.235 
(.268) 
-.980 
(.239) 
-1.007 
(.250) 
Change in Clear Up Rate  -.170 
(.078) 
-.175 
(.081) 
Change in Log(Unemployment Rate)   .080 
(.088) 
Demographic Controls No Yes Yes 
R-Squared .400 .468 .486 
Change in Log(Property Crime Rate) 
Proportion Paid Beneath Minimum Wage in Year 
Before Introduction 
-1.236 
(.337) 
-.894  
(.235) 
-.910 
(.239) 
Change in Clear Up Rate  -.257 
(.076) 
-.260 
(.078) 
Change in Log(Unemployment Rate)   .045 
(.071) 
Demographic Controls No Yes Yes 
R-Squared .400 .572 .578 
Change in Log(Vehicle Crime Rate) 
Proportion Paid Beneath Minimum Wage in Year 
Before Introduction 
-1.166 
(.253) 
-1.012 
(.282) 
-1.002 
(.283) 
Change in Clear Up Rate  -.157 
(.091) 
-.156 
(.092) 
Change in Log(Unemployment Rate)   -.029 
(.101) 
Demographic Controls No Yes Yes 
R-Squared .292 .378 .380 
Change in Log(Violent Crime Rate) 
Proportion Paid Beneath Minimum Wage in Year 
Before Introduction 
-1.079 
(.281) 
-1.005 
(.471) 
-1.053 
(.520) 
Change in Clear Up Rate  -.003 
(.126) 
-.012 
(.133) 
Change in Log(Unemployment Rate)   .141 
(.064) 
Demographic Controls No Yes Yes 
R-Squared .121 .261 .285 
 
Notes: Coefficients (heteroskedastic consistent standard errors) reported. The sample size in all regressions 
is 41 police force areas. All regressions weighted by area population. The demographic controls entered 
were – change in average age, change in the population share of young (<25) men, change in population 
share with no educational qualifications, change in proportion female, change in share of public sector jobs.  
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Table 4: Benchmarking Against Earlier Time Periods 
 
[Change in financial year 1998/99 to 1999/2000 benchmarked against change in financial 
year 1996/97 to 1997/98 and change in financial year 1995/6 to1996/7 in (1), (2), (3) and 
(5); 
Change in financial year 1998/99 to 1999/2000 benchmarked against change in financial 
year 1997/98 to 1998/99 (scaled by Home Office factors for reporting changes), change 
in financial year 1996/97 to 1997/98 and change in financial year 1995/6 to1996/7 in (4)] 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Basic 
Specification
(1) + Clear 
Up and 
Demographics
(2) + 
Unemployment
(3) + Add 
Definition 
Change 
Year 
(3) + 
Area 
Trends 
Change in Log 
(Total Crime Rate) 
Proportion Paid Beneath 
Minimum Wage in Year 
Before Introduction in 
Period Surrounding 
Introduction 
-.963 
(.317) 
-.770 
(.255) 
-.764 
(.257) 
-.917 
(.270) 
-.479 
(.298) 
R-Squared .372 .421 .437 .284 .615 
Change in Log 
(Property Crime Rate) 
Proportion Paid Beneath 
Minimum Wage in Year 
Before Introduction in 
Period Surrounding 
Introduction 
-.962 
(.359) 
-.806 
(.250) 
-.809 
(.249) 
-1.209 
(.388) 
-.667 
(.214) 
R-Squared .488 .591 .595 .540 .763 
Change in Log 
(Vehicle Crime Rate) 
Proportion Paid Beneath 
Minimum Wage in Year 
Before Introduction in 
Period Surrounding 
Introduction 
-.850 
(.331) 
-.657 
(.300) 
-.656 
(.302) 
-.853 
(.287) 
-.596 
(.355) 
R-Squared .461 .558 .558 .782 .686 
Change in Log 
(Violent Crime Rate) 
Proportion Paid Beneath 
Minimum Wage in Year 
Before Introduction in 
Period Surrounding 
Introduction 
-.962 
(.581) 
-1.104 
(.645) 
-1.098 
(.645) 
-1.155 
(.599) 
 
-1.121 
(.720) 
R-Squared .186 .235 .245 .319 .480 
 
Notes: Coefficients (heteroskedastic consistent standard errors) reported. Sample sizes are 123 for columns (1), 
(2), (3) and (5) and 164 for column (4). All regressions weighted by population. The demographic controls entered 
were – change in average age, change in the population share of young (<25) men, change in population share 
with no educational qualifications, change in proportion female, change in share of public sector job.  All 
equations include dummy variables for time period and the proportion low paid variable.  
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Table 5: 
Further Considerations 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Low Skill 
Males Low 
Pay Measure 
Young Males 
Low Pay 
Measure 
Wage Bill 
Share 
Measure 
Change in Log(Total Crime Rate) 
Proportion Paid Beneath Minimum Wage in Year 
Before Introduction in Period Surrounding 
Introduction 
-.882 
(.315) 
-.387 
(.179) 
-6.660 
(2.291) 
R-Squared .432 .423 .431 
Change in Log(Property Crime Rate) 
Proportion Paid Beneath Minimum Wage in Year 
Before Introduction in Period Surrounding 
Introduction 
-.969 
(.301) 
-.439  
(.142) 
-6.920 
(2.267) 
R-Squared .592 .571 .578 
Change in Log(Vehicle Crime Rate) 
Proportion Paid Beneath Minimum Wage in Year 
Before Introduction in Period Surrounding 
Introduction 
-.798 
(.367) 
-.311 
(.177) 
-5.941 
(2.683) 
R-Squared .556 .547 .550 
Change in Log(Violent Rate) 
Proportion Paid Beneath Minimum Wage in Year 
Before Introduction in Period Surrounding 
Introduction 
-1.292 
(.776) 
-.813 
(.313) 
-9.071 
(5.062) 
R-Squared .240 .248 .239 
 
Notes: These are extensions based upon the same specification as column (3) of Table 4.  Other notes as for 
Table 4. 
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